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1I. Introduction 
Dwayne Simonton worked for the United States Postal 
Service, and when his co-workers and supervisors discovered he 
was gay, they harassed him so severely that he suffered a heart 
attack.1 However, the Second Circuit dismissed his suit for 
sexual orientation discrimination because Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 does not provide a cause of action for sexual 
orientation discrimination.2
In public employment,3 courts generally have allowed 
 
1 See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(showing how Simonton’s co-workers and supervisors threatened 
him, yelled obscenities and anti-gay epithets at him, placed 
notes on the bathroom walls with his name and the names of 
celebrities who had died of AIDS, and physically assaulted him). 
2 See id. at 35 (rejecting Simonton’s argument that harassment 
based on one’s sexual orientation is the same as discrimination 
based on one’s sex); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) 
(prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
3 “Employment” refers to public employment and “employers” refers 
to public employers, unless specified otherwise because victims 
of sexual orientation discrimination, absent a state statutory 
cause of action, must make constitutional claims, which requires 
2employers to discriminate against gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
employees and applicants under the guise of a rational basis 
test, without affording them protection under Title VII.4 This 
seemingly contradicts the Supreme Court’s history of steadily 
extending a fundamental right of privacy, which demands strict 
scrutiny review by courts if the state interferes with 
individuals’ intimate, sexual relations.5 The Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas attempted to reconcile this contradiction by 
decriminalizing private homosexual conduct and by recognizing 
that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals hold a liberty interest in 
their private, homosexual activities.6 However, the Court 
 
state action. 
4 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Township H.S. Dist. 205, 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (applying a rational basis test, which 
balances the employee’s constitutional rights against the 
employer’s legitimate business purposes). 
5 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (framing the Court’s obligation as defining 
the liberty of all individuals, rather than mandating its own 
moral code by limiting liberty to only some). 
6 See 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (extending married persons’ 
liberty interests in their individual decisions concerning the 
intimacies of their physical relationship to unmarried persons, 
3focused on homosexuals’ liberty interests in their private 
homosexual conduct, rather than explicitly categorizing gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals as a suspect class.7 The Court also 
refrained from explicitly defining private homosexual conduct to 
be a fundamental right.8
This Comment argues that while the Lawrence Court did not 
change the applicability of the rational basis test, it makes it 
more difficult for employers to rationally relate their 
employees’ homosexuality to legitimate business purposes, and 
opens the door for future courts and legislatures to protect 
homosexual employees.  Part IIA discusses the constitutional 
claims that homosexual employees typically make against their 
employers.9 Part IIB demonstrates how the courts use a rational 
basis test to analyze these claims, which typically favors the 
 
including homosexuals). 
7 See id. (focusing on cases in which the Court has recognized a 
fundamental right to privacy in individuals’ intimate sexual 
relationships). 
8 See id. (defining homosexual intimacy as a liberty interest, 
but not as a fundamental right). 
9 See infra part IIA (explaining why homosexual employees 
typically make constitutional claims rather than Title VII 
claims). 
4employers’ actions.10 Part IIC shows how the Supreme Court 
expanded its notion of privacy rights to protect homosexual 
conduct.11 Part IID examines Congress’ proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2003 (“ENDA”), which prohibits employers 
from discriminating against employees on the basis of sexual 
orientation.12 Part IIIA argues that Lawrence’s holding changes 
the way future courts will analyze employers’ rational basis 
explanations, significantly diluting employers’ rational basis 
defenses.13 Part IIIB advocates that the Lawrence Court opened 
 
10 See infra part IIB (showing how public employers rationally 
relate their adverse employment actions against their homosexual 
employees to legitimate business purposes, thus escaping 
liability). 
11 See infra part IIC (summarizing how the Court extended 
personal privacy rights to married couples, unmarried 
individuals, minors, and homosexuals). 
12 See infra part IID (exploring Congress’ attempt at creating 
federal legislation that explicitly protects both public and 
private sector employees from sexual orientation 
discrimination). 
13 See infra part IIIA (demonstrating how the Court’s holding in 
Lawrence dictates to future courts how to apply the rational 
basis test through its focus on individual privacy rights). 
5the door for a future Court to recognize gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals as a suspect class, consider homosexual conduct to be 
a fundamental right, and give homosexual employees’ 
constitutional claims heightened or strict scrutiny.14 Lastly, 
Part IIIC alleges that a narrow drafting of ENDA, plus the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence, should enable Congress to finally 
enact ENDA.15 
II. Background 
A. Homosexual Employees Generally Claim Their Employers 
Violated Their Constitutional Rights 
 
Employment relationships, absent employment contracts or 
statutes that state otherwise, are generally terminable at-will 
by either party.16 However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
14 See infra part IIIB (arguing that the Lawrence Court’s focus 
on its prior fundamental privacy rights case law and European 
jurisprudence lay the foundation for the Court, in the future, 
to recognize homosexuals to be a suspect class and private 
homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right). 
15 See infra part IIIC (recognizing how current federal and state 
legislation provide inadequate protection, how the Federal 
Government is traditionally responsible in protecting its 
citizens’ civil rights, and how the Lawrence decision opens the 
door for such federal legislation). 
16 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 671 (West Group 1999) (1994) 
61964 prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire, and 
discriminating against employees with respect to compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, based on the 
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.17 
While Title VII claims are the most common employment 
discrimination claims that employees make, Title VII does not 
expressly prohibit employers from discriminating against 
employees based on the employees’ sexual orientation.18 
Therefore, homosexual employees and applicants must rely on 
other constitutional rights by making their claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.19 
Homosexual employees often claim that their employers have 
violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and 
 
(explaining that in an at-will employment relationship, the 
employer may fire the employee for any or no reason). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) (prohibiting both public 
and private sector employers from engaging in the enumerated 
types of discrimination). 
18 See generally id. (omitting “sexual orientation” as a type of 
prohibited discrimination). 
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005) (allowing public employees to make 
discrimination claims against their employers for violating 
their constitutional and other statutory rights). 
7association.20 Additionally, homosexual employees often allege 
that their employers violated their Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights.21 
B. Courts Analyze Homosexual Employees’ Constitutional 
Claims Using A Rational Basis Test 
 
1. First Amendment Claims 
The Supreme Court established that a rational basis test 
 
20 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (1997) 
(citing a lesbian job applicant’s claim that Georgia’s attorney 
general violated her First Amendment rights of association when 
he revoked an employment offer after finding out she publicly 
claimed she was “married” to, and therefore associated with 
another lesbian). 
21 See, e.g., Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168-69 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (showing 
how a homosexual teacher complained that his employer violated 
his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights when it did not 
renew his contract solely because he was gay); Soc’y for 
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(claiming that the United States Civil Service Commission 
violated a homosexual supply clerk’s due process rights when the 
Commission fired the clerk solely because the Commission feared 
“public contempt” in employing a homosexual). 
8applies to employees’ claims that employers violated their First 
Amendment rights.22 This rational basis test balances the 
employees’ First Amendment rights to free speech and association 
against the employers’ interests in promoting legitimate 
business purposes.23 While the Court did not enumerate 
specifically what factors courts should weigh, it alluded to 
some general considerations that might show impairment of a 
governmental interest sufficient to trigger the balancing test.24 
By holding employers’ views of facts, circumstances, and 
predictions to a mere reasonableness standard, the Court has 
granted employers substantial deference.25 Additionally, the 
 
22 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (requiring courts to balance 
the employer’s and employee’s interests). 
23 See id. (balancing a public school teacher’s interest in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and a public school’s 
interest in promoting workplace efficiency). 
24 See id. at 569-70 (establishing the employer’s interests as 
removing incompetent employees, maintaining discipline by 
immediate superiors, preserving harmony among coworkers, and 
maintaining personal loyalty and confidence when necessary to a 
particular working relationship). 
25 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673-81 (1994) (applying 
a reasonableness standard to a manager’s investigation of the 
9Court has granted a wide degree of deference to employers’ 
judgments when their employees have close working relationships 
essential to fulfilling public responsibilities.26 The Court has 
also granted greater significance to the government’s interests 
when it acts as an employer rather than as a sovereign.27 The 
courts have generally granted employers great deference, denying 
homosexual employees’ First Amendment claims when their 
employers rationally alleged that employing homosexual employees 
would affect the employers’ public credibility, interfere with 
the employers’ abilities to handle controversial matters, appear 
to conflict with states’ sodomy laws, create difficulties 
maintaining supportive working relationships, present conflicts 
of interest in prosecuting homosexual-related crimes, and 
 
facts that led him to fire the employee). 
26 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983) (noting that 
the close working relationship involved in a district attorney’s 
office granted the employer a wide degree of deference). 
27 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (finding that when the government 
acts in its capacity as an employer, its interests in 
effectively and efficiently achieving its goals are greater than 
when the government acts as sovereign because the Framers of the 
Constitution intended the First Amendment to protect citizens 
from the government, not employees from their employer). 
10 
 
present a contrary image to community values.28 
2. Equal Protection And Substantive Due Process Claims 
 
The courts have applied the same rational basis test to 
analyze homosexual employees’ claims that their employers 
violated their Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process 
rights.29 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
28 See, e.g., Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (allowing Georgia’s 
Attorney General to revoke an employment offer to a lesbian 
attorney, legitimizing his concerns about workplace unity, 
public credibility, and the attorney’s questionable commitment 
to upholding the state’s sodomy laws); Childers v. Dallas Police 
Dep’t, 513 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting that an 
employer could discharge a homosexual employee because employing 
him would undermine the police department’s legitimate needs for 
obedience and discipline, could damage the department’s public 
image, and could interfere with the homosexual officer’s duties 
to handle evidence of offenses involving homosexual conduct); 
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(claiming that a public school teacher’s public interviews about 
his homosexuality would substantially disrupt his ability to 
effectively teach). 
29 See Glover, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (applying a rational basis 
test to a homosexual teacher’s claim that his employer violated 
11 
 
Amendment requires public employers to treat all similarly 
situated employees alike.30 When employers treat similarly 
situated employees differently, courts determine whether the 
employment action deserves strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, 
or rational basis scrutiny, depending on if the employee is part 
of a suspect class, quasi-suspect class, or non-suspect class, 
respectively.31 
The Supreme Court defined a suspect class as one that 
deserves extraordinary protection from the majority because a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment has disabled it, and the 
class is in a position of political powerlessness.32 The Court 
 
his Equal Protection rights when it failed to renew his contract 
after discovering he was gay). 
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating that no State shall 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws"). 
31 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance 
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (declaring 
homosexuals to be a non-suspect class because homosexuality is a 
behavior and not an immutable characteristic). 
32 See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) 
(finding that a large, diverse, amorphous class, unified only by 
the fact that they live in a district with a lower tax base, 
12 
 
has also focused on the immutability of the group’s identifying 
trait when determining if someone is part of a suspect class.33 
However, the Supreme Court has recognized only three 
classifications as suspect: race,34 alienage,35 and national 
origin.36 The Court has recognized gender as a quasi-suspect 
class.37 Most courts have not considered homosexuals to be a 
 
does not exhibit suspect class characteristics). 
33 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(recognizing sex, race, and national origin as immutable 
characteristics because they are determined solely by birth). 
34 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (finding that Virginia’s 
miscegenation statute banning interracial marriage was not 
necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest). 
35 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (declaring 
alienage as an inherently suspect class, subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny).  But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72-
75 (1979) (recognizing scenarios where discrimination based on 
alienage did not demand strict scrutiny). 
36 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(finding that an order excluding all persons of Japanese 
ancestry from an area drew strict scrutiny).   
37 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (reaffirming that 
classifications based on gender must be substantially related to 
13 
 
suspect class because they consider homosexuality to be 
behavioral and not an immutable characteristic.38 Because the 
 
serving important governmental objectives for a court to render 
a classification constitutional). 
38 See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 
F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (comparing homosexuality to 
race, gender, and national origin, which are suspect classes 
whose conduct is irrelevant to their identifications).  But see 
Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), 
rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (granting 
homosexuals heightened scrutiny because of historic prejudice 
against homosexuals as a minority group that makes it difficult 
to protect them politically).  The court also noted how sexual 
orientation forms a significant part of a person’s identity and 
is resistant to change or treatment, despite widespread 
discrimination and social pressure against homosexuals.  Id.;
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1998) (changing the court’s focus of suspect class 
definition from the immutability of the characteristic to the 
fact that societies have historically regarded such 
characteristics as defining distinct groups that have faced 
adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice).  Also, 
the court recognized that individuals may change other suspect 
14 
 
Supreme Court has yet to recognize homosexuals as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, employers must merely rationally relate 
their employment decisions based on sexual orientation 
classifications to a legitimate business purpose.39 Regardless 
of the level of scrutiny, employers only violate the Equal 
Protection Clause when they intentionally and purposefully 
discriminate.40 The courts have typically denied homosexual 
employees’ Equal Protection claims where employers rationally 
claimed that employing homosexual employees would jeopardize the 
employers’ security, legitimacy, efficiency, workplace obedience 
and discipline and the employers needed to protect their public 
 
class characteristics at will, such as alienage and religious 
affiliation.  Id. 
39 See Glover, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (ruling that a rational 
basis test applies to a homosexual teacher’s claim that his 
employer violated his Equal Protection rights when it failed to 
renew his contract, but renewed a contract of a similarly 
situated heterosexual employee). 
40 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating 
that the employees must show more than a disparate impact to 
demonstrate the employer violated their Equal Protection 
rights). 
15 
 
images and avoid ridicule and embarrassment.41 
For Substantive Due Process claims, courts require that 
employers’ adverse employment actions pass strict scrutiny, if 
they have interfered with employees’ fundamental rights.42 While 
the Supreme Court has extended a fundamental right to privacy to 
protect individuals’ private, sexual relations, the Supreme 
 
41 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (agreeing that the FBI’s hiring of a homosexual agent 
would undermine the Bureau’s law enforcement credibility and 
pose a security risk); Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1324 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (finding that the government’s security interest in 
collecting foreign intelligence and protecting the nation’s 
secrets justified its discharge of a homosexual federal 
intelligence agent); Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146-47 (stating 
that the government’s interest in maintaining department 
discipline and the government’s concern about the homosexual 
employee’s ability to gain the trust and respect of co-workers 
outweighed the employee’s interest in constitutional protection 
for his homosexual behavior). 
42 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
(finding that the government cannot interfere with married 
couples’ fundamental rights to privacy in their marital 
relationships). 
16 
 
Court has never expressly declared private, consensual 
homosexual conduct to be part of one’s fundamental right to 
privacy, and thus courts routinely deny homosexual employees’ 
Substantive Due Process claims under a rational basis test.43 
C. The Supreme Court Extended Its Notion Of An 
Individual’s Right To Privacy To Protect Private 
Homosexual Conduct 
 
While the courts primarily used a rational basis test to 
decide whether employers discriminated against employees based 
on the employees’ sexual orientations, the Supreme Court 
expanded its view on a homosexual’s right to privacy in Lawrence 
v. Texas.44 The case grew from a steady line of Supreme Court 
cases that extended privacy rights to individuals engaged in 
certain intimate, private behaviors.45 
43 See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146-147 (denying a 
homosexual police officer’s Substantive Due Process claim where 
the police department fired the officer, finding that the 
department acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously, but 
rather rationally related the employment action to legitimate 
employment concerns). 
44 See 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that Texas had no legitimate 
state interest to justify invading homosexuals’ private lives 
via its criminal sodomy statute). 
45 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (including a 
17 
 
First, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a 
state law that prohibited married couples’ use of drugs or 
contraception devices and counseling or aiding and abetting the 
use of contraceptives.46 The Court described the protected 
interest as a right to privacy and placed emphasis on the 
marital relationship.47 
The Court next extended the right to privacy it granted in 
Griswold beyond the marital relationship by invalidating a law 
that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
persons.48 The Court stressed that the law impaired the exercise 
 
woman’s right to have an abortion in a guaranteed zone of 
privacy).  But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) 
(denying homosexuals’ privacy rights to their private, 
homosexual conduct by upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy 
statute). 
46 See 381 U.S. at 485 (finding that the law invaded the privacy 
of the marital relationship). 
47 See id. (emphasizing the marital bedroom as a protected, 
private space). 
48 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) 
(recognizing that unmarried persons enjoyed the same right to 
privacy as married persons). 
18 
 
of personal rights.49 
Next, the Court expanded a woman’s right to privacy, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to include having 
an abortion.50 Again, the Court recognized a more general right 
to privacy rather than enumerating specific areas in which one 
can expect privacy.51 
The Court then extended to minors certain privacy rights it 
had already granted to adults.52 The Court invalidated a New 
York law forbidding the sale or distribution of contraceptive 
devices to persons under sixteen years old.53 The combination of 
 
49 See id. at 443, 448 (holding that the statute violated the 
rights of single persons and that the statute’s purpose of 
deterring premarital sex was not legitimate). 
50 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding that the government may 
not prevent a woman from having an abortion, except for certain 
enumerated circumstances where the state has compelling 
interests).  
51 See id. at 152 (describing the privacy interest as an 
individual’s “zone of privacy”). 
52 See Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 
(1977) (extending to minors the right to privacy in connection 
with decisions affecting procreation). 
53 See id. at 694 (finding that minors have the same right to 
19 
 
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey acted to extend privacy rights beyond 
married adults. 
However, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court took an anomalous 
step and upheld Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute.54 The Court’s 
analysis focused on the United States’ history of condemning 
homosexual conduct.55 The Court also found no connection between 
homosexual conduct and other fundamental rights that the Court 
had recognized in previous decisions.56 Following this purported 
history and lack of connection, the Bowers Court held that 
homosexuals did not have a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual activity.57 
privacy as adults regarding procreation). 
54 See 478 U.S. at 196 (allowing the state to impose on 
homosexuals its moral disapproval of homosexual conduct). 
55 See id. at 192-94 (focusing on the frequency of criminal 
sodomy statutes in effect when the states ratified the Bill of 
Rights as well as when Congress enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
56 See id. at 191 (noting no connection between the personal 
rights of family, marriage, and procreation to homosexuality). 
57 See id. at 192-94 (reasoning that a fundamental right is one 
that is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition).  
Because this Nation historically has proscribed homosexual 
20 
 
Ten years later, in Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated 
an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution that prohibited all 
legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect 
homosexual persons from discrimination.58 The Court stated that 
class-based legislation, legislation that imposes a disability 
on a single named group, was invalid.59 
Finally, the Court relied on these cases when it decided, 
in Lawrence v. Texas, to strike down Texas’ criminal sodomy 
statute and overrule Bowers.60 For the first time, the Court 
recognized that homosexuals held a right to privacy in their 
private, consensual homosexual activities under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Lawrence Court focused 
 
conduct, the Court was unwilling to declare it a fundamental 
right.  Id. 
58 See 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (stating that Colorado’s 
Amendment was based on pure animus and bigotry). 
59 See id. at 634 (recognizing that animosity toward the class of 
persons affected cannot be a legitimate governmental interest). 
60 See 539 U.S. at 577-78 (finding that society’s standards of 
morality cannot be a rational basis for condemning what it views 
to be an immoral practice). 
61 See id. (analogizing homosexuals’ liberty interests in their 
private, consensual, homosexual conduct to married and non-
21 
 
on the demeaning effects criminal sodomy statutes created, 
regardless of whether or not the state actually enforced them, 
when applicable against private, consenting, homosexual adults.62 
Additionally, the Lawrence Court rebutted its Bowers analysis of 
this Nation’s history of condemning homosexual conduct.63 
Instead, the Lawrence Court recognized that states created early 
sodomy laws in order to prohibit non-procreative sexual 
activity.64 Moreover, the Lawrence Court noted that early state 
sodomy laws acted as a catch-all to prosecute sexual predators 
 
married persons’ liberty interests in their individual decisions 
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships). 
62 See id. at 575-76 (recognizing that criminal offenses impose 
stigmas on convicts, which range from recording convictions on 
one’s history of criminal convictions, subjecting convicts to 
the registration laws of at least four states, and noting 
convictions on job application forms). 
63 See id. at 568 (refuting the notion that this country has a 
longstanding history of criminalizing homosexual conduct as 
opposed to sodomy). 
64 See id. (explaining that the states’ early criminal sodomy 
laws did not focus on homosexuals as a distinct class for 
enforcement). 
22 
 
whose actions did not fall into the category of rape.65 
The Lawrence Court justified declaring criminal sodomy statutes 
unconstitutional by focusing on the Court’s more recent history 
of extending the sphere of privacy rights; ultimately including 
private, consensual, homosexual activity in that sphere.66 
However, the Court stopped short of recognizing gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals as a suspect class or their private homosexual 
conduct as a fundamental right.67 
D. Congress’ Attempts To Enact The Employment Non-
Discrimination Act 
 
In 2003, Congress, recognizing the problem of sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment, reintroduced ENDA, 
which prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire, 
and discriminating against employees with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
 
65 See id. at 569 (noting that states mainly enforced state 
sodomy laws against predatory sexual acts of an adult man 
against a child, rather than against consenting adults). 
66 See id. at 571-72 (demonstrating the Court’s more recent trend 
of granting liberty rights that protect adults’ decisions about 
private matters pertaining to sex). 
67 See id. (reserving judgment on whether to grant homosexuals 
heightened scrutiny). 
23 
 
based on the employee’s sexual orientation.68 Congress first 
introduced ENDA in 1994, but has failed to enact ENDA since its 
original proposition.69 In 1996, the last time ENDA came to a 
vote, the Senate rejected it.70 
III. Analysis 
A. The Court’s Analysis In Lawrence Forces Future Courts 
To Question The Reasonableness Of The Employers’ 
Traditional Rational Bases 
 
At one end of the spectrum, states can no longer condemn 
private, consensual, homosexual conduct as criminal activity.71 
However, at the other end of the spectrum, the Lawrence Court 
 
68 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 4 (2003) (stating ENDA’s purposes as providing federal 
protection and remedies against employment discrimination based 
on sexual orientation). 
69 See Price Waterhouse, Sex Stereotyping, and Gender Non-
Conformity Bias, THE U.S. LAW WEEK, Oct. 19, 2004, at 2211 n.7 
(demonstrating how Congress has rejected ENDA seven times since 
it first introduced ENDA in 1994). 
70 See 142 CONG.REC. D912-02 (1996) (showing how the Senate 
rejected ENDA by one vote). 
71 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (decriminalizing homosexual 
activity because one’s homosexuality is a private liberty 
interest). 
24 
 
did not explicitly declare homosexuals to be a suspect class of 
citizenry, worthy of strict scrutiny, nor did the Court 
recognize their private, consensual, homosexual conduct to be a 
fundamental right.72 The Court, thus, has to determine where to 
place homosexual activity on their analytical spectrum. 
While the Court in Lawrence did not change the
applicability of the rational basis test, its focus will cause 
future courts to question the reasonableness of employers’ 
rational bases for their adverse employment actions against 
their homosexual employees.73 In declaring criminal sodomy 
statutes unconstitutional, the Court attempted to overcome the 
stigma it recognized criminal sodomy laws created.74 Under the 
 
72 See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the 
Lawrence majority does not explicitly recognize homosexuals as a 
suspect class and does not expressly consider homosexual conduct 
a fundamental right, but rather ambiguously declares homosexual 
conduct to be a liberty interest without further definition). 
73 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675-76 (showing the Court’s 
willingness to grant greater deference to employers’ rationales 
when employers merely prove that their rationales are 
reasonable). 
74 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76 (focusing on how homosexuals 
convicted of sex crimes must disclose convictions on job 
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Court’s reasoning in Bowers, the courts generally found 
employers’ rationales reasonably related to legitimate business 
purposes because the employers’ legitimate business purposes 
reflected the Court’s recognition of society’s moral and 
criminal condemnation of homosexual activity.75 After Lawrence,
the courts must apply the rational basis test such that the 
employers’ legitimate business purposes reflect the Court’s 
recognition of homosexuals’ liberty interests in their own 
private, consensual, homosexual activity.76 More specifically, 
Lawrence significantly dilutes the employers’ traditional 
rational basis defenses by forcing future courts to question the 
reasonableness of employers’ claims that homosexual employees 
are not fit for employment because they are engaged in criminal 
activity, and that hiring homosexual employees destroys 
 
applications and are subject to some states’ registration laws). 
75 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (declaring that society’s moral 
judgment of homosexual activity is rationally related to 
condemning such activity as criminal). 
76 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (stating that society’s moral 
judgment of homosexual activity cannot justify condemning such 
activity as criminal and override homosexuals’ individual 
liberty rights in their private, consensual, homosexual 
activity). 
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workplace unity, is contrary to the employers’ public images and 
credibility, and poses risks to national security. 
1. Criminality 
 
The Lawrence decision eliminates employers’ common tactic 
of claiming that homosexual employees are engaged in criminal 
activity and therefore unfit for employment.77 By extending 
constitutional protections to homosexual conduct, the Lawrence 
decision stops employers from facially discriminating against 
their homosexual employees simply due to their employees’ 
private homosexual conduct because employers cannot condition 
employment on the relinquishment of a legal right.78 
For example, applying the argument to the field of law 
enforcement, employers cannot reasonably question homosexual 
employees’ commitments to upholding and enforcing state sodomy 
 
77 See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 142 (showing a pre-
Lawrence case where a police department claimed that a 
homosexual officer was unfit for service because the officer had 
engaged in criminal activity, namely homosexual sodomy). 
78 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 
(noting that although the Constitution does not guarantee public 
employment, conditioning employment on the relinquishment of 
one’s First Amendment rights would undermine one’s 
constitutional freedoms of speech and association). 
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laws because the Court in Lawrence declared the laws 
unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable.79 Prior to 
Lawrence, courts gave credence to employers’ concerns about 
hiring homosexual law enforcement officers, finding that the 
officers had an inherent conflict of interest with enforcing 
homosexual sodomy crimes that they themselves violated.80 The 
Lawrence decision, however distinguished private, consensual, 
homosexual conduct from other valid criminal sodomy laws, 
therefore calling into question employers’ concerns about 
homosexual officers’ commitments to enforcing valid homosexual 
sodomy crimes.81 By decriminalizing private, consensual, 
 
79 See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence 
case in which the court decided that the Attorney General could 
reasonably believe that hiring a lesbian attorney would inhibit 
his office from prosecuting Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute). 
80 See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 137 (demonstrating a pre-
Lawrence case that gave deference to a police department’s 
concern that hiring a homosexual officer for its property 
division would jeopardize the evidence’s authenticity because 
the officer had an inherent conflict of interest in preserving 
evidence of a homosexual crime). 
81 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (narrowing the Lawrence Court’s 
holding so that criminal sodomy laws aimed at protecting minors, 
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homosexual conduct, the Lawrence Court eliminated homosexual law 
enforcement officers’ conflicts of interest as well as the 
employers’ rational bases for denying employment, because the 
officers will no longer enforce the invalid laws that they 
previously violated.82 
The Lawrence Court did uphold the validity of certain 
criminal sodomy laws, and employers might still claim that 
homosexual law enforcement officers have a conflict of interest 
in enforcing these remaining valid laws.83 However, these claims 
will likely fail in the same way as a police department’s claim 
that a female law enforcement officer presents a conflict of 
interest in enforcing prostitution laws.  Homosexual law 
 
protecting persons whom the conduct would injure or coerce, 
prohibiting non-consensual relationships, and prohibiting public 
conduct or prostitution remained valid, as well as holding that 
the government does not have to recognize homosexual 
relationships). 
82 See id. (finding that the state cannot criminalize private 
sexual conduct). 
83 See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 137 (noting a pre-
Lawrence case that legitimized a police department’s concern 
that a homosexual officer might destroy homosexual mail order 
materials or tip off homosexual groups about police raids). 
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enforcement officers, who engage solely in constitutionally 
protected, private, consensual, homosexual activity, do not have 
a conflict of interest in enforcing valid criminal laws, which 
their conduct does not violate.84 
The Lawrence holding also vastly affects how courts will 
apply state statutes that allow public schools to fire 
homosexual teachers for engaging in immoral or criminal 
conduct.85 For example, a public school in Alaska merely had to 
show sufficient evidence that a homosexual teacher committed a 
crime of moral turpitude in order to dismiss the teacher.86 
84 See id. at 137-38 (disclosing how a homosexual officer 
belonged to a Christian church with a special outreach to the 
gay community, had marched in two Gay Pride Parades, and had 
participated in picketing to protest a television program that 
portrayed homosexual males as child molesters, but was not part 
of a homosexual or male prostitution group). 
85 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(2)(2004) (defining 
immorality as “the commission of an act that, under the laws of 
the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude”).  
86 See Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 691 P.2d 
1034, 1040 (Alaska 1984) (stating that a public school may fire 
a teacher for engaging in a crime of moral turpitude, even when 
the state has not convicted the teacher). 
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Lawrence makes it more difficult for a school to dismiss the 
teacher whether the school considers homosexuality to be a crime 
in the traditional sense or figuratively.  First, by removing 
the criminality of homosexual sodomy, Lawrence makes it more 
difficult for a public school to show any evidence that a 
teacher who engaged in private, consensual homosexual conduct 
was therefore engaged in a crime of moral turpitude.87 Further, 
even if the definition of immorality did not require that 
teachers commit a criminal act of moral turpitude before a 
school could fire them, but rather just required a school to 
make moral judgments based on community standards, Lawrence 
requires public schools to protect homosexual teachers’ liberty 
rights instead of imposing society’s moral values on teachers’ 
homosexual conduct.88 By removing the criminality of homosexual 
 
87 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that the state may not 
demean homosexuals’ existence by criminalizing their private 
sexual conduct). 
88 See Ross v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 641 P.2d 600, 608 
(Or. Ct. App. 1982) review allowed, 648 P.2d 852 (Or. 1982), 
rev’d on other grounds, 657 P.2d 188 (Or. 1982) (demonstrating a 
pre-Lawrence case, which held that a public school properly 
discharged a teacher because the public nature of the teacher’s 
homosexual conduct was immoral, not necessarily the conduct 
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activity, the Court in Lawrence removed a major weapon from the 
employer’s arsenal. 
2. Workplace Unity 
Lawrence also forces the courts to question employers’ 
claims that employing homosexual employees will disrupt 
workplace unity.89 Again, using law enforcement as an example, 
when the Court decriminalized homosexual conduct, it removed the 
only legitimate, actionable source of tension between employees, 
namely having to decide whether or not to arrest and prosecute 
their homosexual colleagues for engaging in the criminal conduct 
of homosexual sodomy.90 The Lawrence decision prohibits 
employers from acting on any remaining sources of tension 
between employees and their homosexual colleagues, such as 
individual employee disagreements about the morality of 
homosexual conduct, because under Lawrence employers must 
 
itself). 
89 See, e.g., Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing staff 
cohesiveness as a legitimate business concern). 
90 See Endsley v. Naes, 673 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 1987) 
(holding that the police department legitimately fired a 
homosexual police officer in order to maintain close working 
relationships both internally and externally with the 
community). 
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preserve homosexual employees’ liberty rights over imposing 
other employees’ moral judgments of homosexuality.91 Likewise, 
employers cannot forbid homosexual employees from engaging in 
private, consensual homosexual conduct, just to avoid workplace 
conflict, in the same way that employers cannot forbid employees 
to advocate religion in the workplace, even though that may 
cause workplace tension as well.92 While courts recognize 
employers’ strong interests in avoiding tension in the 
workplace, Lawrence does not allow the employer to trump 
homosexual employees’ rights to engage in homosexual conduct 
simply to bolster workplace unity.93 
91 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that imposing society’s 
moral judgment on homosexuals is not a legitimate interest to 
criminalize homosexual conduct). 
92 See Tucker v. California Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1211 
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the employer’s ban on religious 
advocacy in the workplace was not necessary to further the 
employer’s interest in workplace efficiency and discipline). 
93 See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence 
case in which the employer claimed that employing a lesbian 
attorney would create difficulties in maintaining working 
relationships in Georgia’s Attorney General’s office). 
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3. Public Image And Credibility 
By declaring criminal sodomy statutes unconstitutional, the 
Lawrence Court removed the types of criticisms that employers 
alleged society would make as a result of employing homosexual 
employees.  Again, using the field of law enforcement as an 
example, Lawrence causes future courts to question employers’ 
concerns about the public credibility of their offices because 
society will not look poorly upon an employer for hiring 
employees that do no not uphold and enforce unconstitutional 
laws.94 Moreover, the Lawrence decision makes society’s views of 
an office’s credibility irrelevant with respect to hiring 
homosexual employees that society deems are engaged in immoral 
conduct.95 Because the Court in Lawrence reasoned that society 
 
94 See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (showing a pre-Lawrence case in 
which the court found that the Georgia Attorney General could 
reasonably conclude that hiring a lesbian attorney would 
undermine the office’s public credibility because a lesbian 
attorney might be unwilling to enforce the state’s criminal 
sodomy laws). 
95 See id. (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence case where the court 
upheld the employer’s reasoning that hiring a lesbian attorney 
would send a signal to society that the Attorney General’s 
Office was hypocritical to the Office’s prior stance of 
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cannot criminalize conduct it finds to be immoral, employers 
cannot impose society’s moral judgments of homosexuality on 
their homosexual employees as that would be tantamount to the 
state imposing society’s morality in criminalizing homosexual 
conduct.96 
Moreover, the Lawrence decision changes the employers’ 
public messages and images that they must project.97 For 
example, under the Bowers’ rationale, law enforcement employers 
denied employment to homosexuals under the guise that this 
denial was necessary to reflect society’s moral condemnation of 
homosexual activity.98 The Lawrence Court eliminated this 
rationale by rejecting the premise that the state can 
criminalize homosexual conduct as a reflection of society’s 
 
upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute). 
96 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (finding that society’s 
morals do not justify criminalizing one’s private conduct).  
97 See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing the legitimacy of 
the Georgia Attorney General’s concern about his office 
appearing conflicted about interpretations of Georgia law if he 
hired a lesbian attorney). 
98 See Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 140-41 (recognizing a strong 
state interest in its police department reflecting a majority of 
society’s values). 
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values.99 Lawrence stands for the reasoning that employers must 
uphold their homosexual employees’ liberty rights, through their 
public messages and images, even at the risk of conflicting with 
society’s moral condemnation of their employees’ homosexual 
conduct.100 
4. National Security Risks 
The Court’s Lawrence decision also forecloses the return of 
sexual orientation discrimination based on the government’s 
national security concerns.101 The government’s original concern 
was that Communists, or other anti-American groups, would 
blackmail homosexual government employees by threatening to 
expose the employees’ homosexuality in order to gain access to 
confidential materials.102 As a result, the government subjected 
 
99 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that reflecting 
society’s values is not a legitimate government interest to 
sustain a state’s criminal sodomy statute). 
100 See id. (stating that the government may not interfere with 
homosexuals’ personal liberty, simply because a majority of 
society morally condemns homosexual conduct). 
101 See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575-76 (validating the 
Government’s concern that hiring homosexual employees would 
compromise the Government’s confidential material). 
102 See David K. Johnson, Homosexual Citizens: Washington’s Gay 
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homosexual employees to much more rigorous background checks 
than their heterosexual colleagues.103 The courts found this 
rationale reasonable under the Court’s decision in Bowers,
because homosexual employees feared exposing their homosexuality 
where it would likely lead to loss of employment and possible 
criminal prosecution.104 However, the Court’s decision in 
 
Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter 
1994-95, at 54 (explaining that the United States Civil Service 
did not necessarily doubt homosexual employees’ loyalties, but 
rather was concerned that homosexuals were at greater risk to 
blackmail and therefore posed a security risk). 
103 See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575-76 (upholding 
extensive background checks for homosexual employees on the 
grounds that they are rationally related to protecting the 
government’s legitimate security interests because homosexual 
employees present a greater risk for blackmail and coercion). 
104 See Johnson, supra note 102, at 53-54 (demonstrating how 
federal employees reasonably feared losing their jobs once 
Congress raised a suspicion of their individual homosexuality).  
But see Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 7, 
1995) (prohibiting the government from discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation when granting security clearances by 
ending the government’s practice of subjecting homosexual 
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Lawrence causes the courts to question this rationale’s 
reasonableness because under Lawrence, homosexual employees no 
longer fear criminal prosecution of their private, homosexual 
conduct.105 
The Lawrence Court’s decision also diminishes the 
government’s national security concerns through its focus on the 
Model Penal Code and the greater social stigma that criminal 
sodomy statutes had imposed on homosexuals.106 The Model Penal 
Code recognized the potential for individuals to blackmail 
homosexual government employees, and specifically cited that 
 
applicants for clearances to an extensive background 
investigation on that basis alone). 
105 See Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (exemplifying a pre-Lawrence case 
in which the court upheld the FBI’s decision not to hire a 
homosexual agent because it would pose a security risk); Doe,
981 F.2d at 1324 (showing a pre-Lawrence case where the court 
found that a homosexual federal intelligence agent infringed on 
the government’s security interest in collecting foreign 
intelligence and protecting the nation’s secrets). 
106 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572, 575 (noting how the Model 
Penal Code’s recommendation and the stigma that criminal sodomy 
statutes created infringed on homosexuals’ liberty interests in 
their private, consensual, homosexual activities). 
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potential as one of its reasons for not recommending criminal 
sodomy statutes against private, consenting adults.107 By
recognizing the Model Penal Code’s recommendation and by 
focusing on the stigma attached to criminal sodomy statutes, the 
Lawrence Court’s decision to overrule the criminal sodomy 
statutes as the major cause of the blackmail and social stigma 
signaled the Court’s attempt at overcoming these evils.108 By
removing the possibility of criminal sanctions, the Court 
removed the effectiveness of attempting to blackmail homosexual 
employees because in addition to not fearing criminal 
prosecution, homosexual employees will not feel the same 
pressure of facing the added social stigma that criminal 
sanctions would impose if one exposed the homosexual employee’s 
 
107 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 372 (1980) (justifying 
its recommendation because criminal sodomy statutes 1) penalize 
conduct that many people engage in, which undermines respect for 
the law; 2) punish people for their private actions that do not 
harm others; and 3) invite the danger of blackmail when the 
courts arbitrarily enforce them). 
108 See id. at 578 (stating that the state cannot demean 
homosexuals’ existence or control their destiny by criminalizing 
their private sexual conduct). 
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sexual orientation to the public.109 The Court’s decision in 
Lawrence minimized both the incentive and potential for 
blackmail, thus questioning employers’ national security 
concerns.110 
B. The Lawrence Decision Opened The Door For A Future 
Court To Declare Homosexuals To Be A Suspect Class, And 
Private, Homosexual Conduct To Be A Fundamental Right 
 
The Court, by declaring gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to be 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and by declaring private, 
homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right, would provide 
homosexual employees with greater protection than under a 
rational basis test because it would require employers to meet 
the higher standard of at least substantially relating their 
employment decisions to important business purposes, rather than 
just rationally relating employment decisions to legitimate 
 
109 See Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 609 (D.D.C. 
1972) (citing a pre-Lawrence case that found that the government 
may question a homosexual employee’s background extensively out 
of a legitimate concern in maintaining the security of 
classified information and the Civil Service’s overall 
efficiency). 
110 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noticing the potential for 
blackmail when homosexual employees’ private homosexual conduct 
is criminalized). 
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business purposes.111 While the majority in Lawrence did not 
explicitly declare homosexual a suspect class and did not 
explicitly grant homosexual conduct fundamental right status, 
the opinion’s reasoning focused on case law whose principles 
favor such findings.112 Additionally, the Court focused on 
European jurisprudence that applied strict scrutiny to 
government actions against private, consensual homosexual 
conduct in the same manner that the United States Supreme Court 
has treated other fundamental rights, such as individuals’ 
rights to privacy in their private, intimate conduct.113 
111 Cf. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 
(1980) (applying intermediate level scrutiny to gender-based 
discrimination, gender being a quasi-suspect class, and 
requiring the discriminatory action to be substantially related 
to important governmental objectives). 
112 See 539 U.S. at 572-73 (focusing on cases, such as Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Carey, which have declared individuals’ privacy 
rights in matters pertaining to sex fundamental rights). 
113 Compare Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 489 
(accepting homosexuality as an integral part of human freedom 
and holding that government actions had to be ‘necessary’ 
towards achieving compelling government interests) with
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443, 448 (invalidating a state law that 
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1. Creating A Fundamental Right To Privacy 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, focusing on how Texas’ 
criminal sodomy statute did not pass a rational basis test under 
the Equal Protection Clause, likely forced the majority to stop 
short of explicitly finding private, consensual homosexual 
conduct to be a fundamental right at the risk of losing her 
support.114 Justice O’Connor joined in the Bowers majority, 
which declared that homosexual conduct was not a fundamental 
right.115 Therefore, if the Lawrence majority explicitly 
 
prohibited the sale of contraceptives to non-married individuals 
because it invaded individuals’ fundamental rights to privacy in 
their private, sexual conduct and was not a necessary 
restriction aimed at achieving a compelling government 
interest). 
114 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(basing her conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause rather 
than contradicting the Bowers majority by declaring homosexual 
conduct a fundamental right). 
115 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95 (demonstrating the Court’s 
reluctance to expand its definition of a fundamental right to 
include homosexual conduct because of the Court’s belief that 
doing so would be exercising judge-made constitutional law, 
bringing the Court closer to illegitimacy). 
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declared homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right, Justice 
O’Connor could not have supported the Lawrence majority because 
she would have been forced to overrule her prior decision in 
Bowers.116 However, the majority’s focus is more consistent with 
the Court’s jurisprudential direction of expanding fundamental 
privacy rights to individuals’ private, sexual conduct.117 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized marriage as one 
of the “basic civil rights of man.”118 If marriage is such an 
important interest, then as an integral part of marriage, 
couples’ private, intimate conduct should be accorded the same 
weight.119 The Court in Lawrence rationalized overturning state 
 
116 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(writing that the Justice joined the Bowers majority and was 
unwilling to join the Lawrence plurality in overruling it). 
117 See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55 (extending a 
fundamental right to privacy to cover unmarried couples’ 
interests in their private, intimate conduct). 
118 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (applying strict scrutiny to 
Virginia’s miscegenation law, which prohibited interracial 
marriage). 
119 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association 
et al. at 15-23, Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (stating 
that sexual intimacy is a fundamental aspect of human 
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sodomy laws because it recognized that partners’ intimate sexual 
relations are an important privacy interest.120 By focusing on 
privacy rights rather than an Equal Protection analysis, the 
Court paved the foundation for a future Court to explicitly 
declare that private, homosexual conduct is a fundamental right, 
consistent with other fundamental privacy rights that the Court 
has granted.121 
The Lawrence Court’s focus on European jurisprudence to 
impeach its previous findings in Bowers implicitly supports a 
 
experience); see also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, AMERICAN COUPLES:
MONEY, WORK, SEX 193, 201, 205-06 (1983) (saying that, “[A] good 
sex life is central to a good overall relationship”). 
120 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (finding that homosexual 
persons’ intimate conduct can simply be but one element of a 
more enduring relationship). 
121 See Bobbie L. Stratton, A Prediction Of The United States 
Supreme Court’s Analysis Of The Defense Of Marriage Act, After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 46 S.TEX.L.REV. 361, 388 (arguing that the 
Lawrence Court’s focus on the history of society’s acceptance of 
homosexuals, on prohibiting society’s moral values from trumping 
individual liberties, and on disapproving of laws that are based 
on animus towards a group, will allow future courts to declare 
the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional). 
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finding that homosexual conduct is a fundamental right because 
the European cases that the Court cites use strict scrutiny to 
protect homosexual conduct under a fundamental right to privacy 
in the same way that the United States Supreme Court has used 
strict scrutiny to protect other liberties as fundamental 
rights.122 The Court cited the Wolfenden Report, which advised 
the British Parliament to repeal laws that punished homosexual 
conduct, and the ensuing Sexual Offences Act of 1967, which 
enacted the report’s recommendations.123 The Court also cited 
 
122 See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 
164 (invalidating a law that prohibited private, homosexual 
conduct, providing that the law was not ‘necessary’ to achieving 
Northern Ireland’s important interests of protecting certain 
sections of society, such as children, and the morality of the 
citizenry as a whole). 
123 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-573 (citing The Wolfenden 
Report as evidence rebutting the Bowers Court finding that 
Western civilization and Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards condemned homosexual conduct); see also The Wolfenden 
Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and 
Prostitution (Stein & Day, Inc. 1963) (concluding that outlawing 
homosexuality impinged on homosexuals’ civil liberties and that 
it was not the law’s job to impose private morality on others); 
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European Court of Human Rights cases with similar legal 
rationale to U.S. jurisprudence involving fundamental rights 
status.124 Specifically, these cases declared laws proscribing 
private, homosexual conduct invalid because they invaded 
individuals’ rights to privacy and they were not “necessary” to 
achieve important government interests.125 
Furthermore, in its amicus brief, Amnesty International 
urged the Lawrence Court to reject its Bowers holding in the 
same way that European courts have done.126 By citing these 
 
Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, c. 60, § 1 (Eng.) (decriminalizing 
private homosexual conduct between two consenting adult men). 
124 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (citing European Court of Human 
Rights cases that have protected homosexual adults’ rights to 
engage in intimate, consensual conduct). 
125 See, e.g., Modinos, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 489 (prohibiting the 
government from interfering in the private and family life of 
homosexuals because the government’s intrusion is not 
‘necessary’ to serve the government’s interests in, “national 
security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”). 
126 See Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International et al. at 9, 
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European Human Rights Court cases, the Court in Lawrence gave 
weight to Amnesty International’s argument that decisions to 
engage in sexual conduct with members of the same sex are among, 
“the most intimate and personal choices a person can make in a 
lifetime.”127 By focusing on how European courts treat 
homosexual conduct as a fundamental right to privacy, the 
Lawrence Court gave credence to the argument that courts should 
treat homosexual conduct as a fundamental right and opened the 
door for future courts to use Lawrence to create a fundamental 
right to private, homosexual conduct. 
2. Granting Heightened Scrutiny To Homosexuals’ Equal 
Protection Claims 
 
While the courts largely have foreclosed homosexual 
employees’ arguments that sexual orientation discrimination is 
akin to discrimination on the basis of sex for Title VII 
purposes, many courts have granted such claims in areas outside 
of Title VII, such as Equal Protection claims involving same sex 
 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(No. 02-102) (noting how foreign 
courts have rejected Bowers’ principles based on a decisional 
theory, relational theory, and zonal theory of privacy). 
127 Id. at 10 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (asserting that 
homosexual conduct fits into Casey’s decisional theory of 
privacy, which protects persons’ choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy). 
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marriage.128 In these cases, the courts have granted same sex 
couples heightened scrutiny for their Equal Protection claims.129 
If homosexual couples get heightened scrutiny analysis when they 
argue that state laws prohibiting same sex marriage violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, then homosexual employees should get 
heightened scrutiny analysis when they argue that their 
employers fired them for being homosexual, thus violating their 
Equal Protection rights.130 
C. Congress Should Enact The Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act 
 
Congress should enact ENDA because current Federal 
legislation, mainly Title VII, neither effectively nor 
 
128 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (finding that 
a restriction disallowing same-sex couples from applying for a 
marriage license constituted a sex-based classification). 
129 See id. (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has granted 
heightened scrutiny, considering same sex challenges as 
classifications based on gender when analyzing Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims).  
130 Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (granting same-sex couples 
heightened scrutiny when analyzing a law prohibiting same-sex 
marriage) with Glover, 20 F. Supp.2d at 1169 (applying a 
rational basis test to a homosexual employee’s Equal Protection 
claim where his employer fired him for being gay). 
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consistently protects both private and public sector employees 
from sexual orientation discrimination.131 In effect, ENDA’s 
drafters designed ENDA to mimic Title VII so that it would 
effectively and consistently protect employees from sexual 
orientation discrimination in the same manner that Title VII 
protects employees from racial, sexual, religious, and national 
origin discrimination.132 While individual states have enacted 
their own anti-discrimination legislation, expressly prohibiting 
sexual orientation discrimination,133 most states still do not 
 
131 See Taylor Flynn, Transforming The Debate: Why We Need To 
Include Transgender Rights In The Struggles For Sex And Sexual 
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 402 (2001) 
(demonstrating inconsistencies with the way that courts treat 
Title VII sex discrimination claims because some courts equate 
sex with gender and sexual orientation and some do not). 
132 See 142 CONG. REC. S9986-01, S9986 (1996) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (explaining that ENDA’s drafters modeled it after Title 
VII and that their purpose was merely to add sexual orientation 
to the list of employment practices that Title VII already 
prohibits). 
133 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2005) 
(exemplifying Connecticut’s civil rights statute, which 
explicitly prohibits employers from discriminating against 
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have such legislation, leaving most homosexual employees 
vulnerable.134 While the Senate continually has rejected past 
versions of ENDA, a more narrow construction of ENDA, plus the 
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence, debunk many opposing Senators’ 
concerns about ENDA and open the door for Congress to pass 
federal legislation prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace.135 
employees on the basis of sexual orientation). 
134 See Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation (listing the states, 
cities, and counties that prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination in public employment, private employment, public 
accommodations, education, housing, credit, and union practices, 
along with the relevant source that prohibits the 
discrimination), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=217 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2005). 
135 See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 39 (discussing the minority view 
of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions that ENDA is overly broad and unclear regarding its 
effect on individual, constitutional and states’ rights). 
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1. Current Federal And State Legislation Neither 
Effectively Nor Consistently Protects Employees From 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
 
New federal legislation, specifically prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment, is necessary because 
the courts generally do not recognize a cause of action for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation under the current 
federal legislation of Title VII.136 The courts repeatedly have 
held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination or 
harassment based on a worker’s sexual preference.137 Most courts 
also conclude that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of one’s “sex” is different than discrimination on the 
basis of one’s “sexual orientation.”138 
136 See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods. Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 
1059 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that proof that co-workers 
harassed a male employee because they thought he was gay was not 
enough to prove discrimination on the basis of sex without 
additional evidence linking the bias to sex rather than sexual 
orientation). 
137 See, e.g., Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (denying a homosexual 
employee’s Title VII sexual harassment claim because the 
harassers based their harassment on the homosexual employee’s 
sexual orientation rather than his sex). 
138 See id. at 36 (stating that “sex” refers to membership in a 
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The courts are also split in characterizing sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination 
whereby employers discriminate against a gay male employee for 
being too effeminate or against a lesbian female employee for 
being too masculine.139 Only a small minority of courts have 
been willing to protect homosexual employees under the theory 
that sexual stereotyping of homosexuals is discrimination on the 
basis of sex and therefore actionable under Title VII.140 Most 
 
class delineated by gender, not sexual orientation).  But see 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 
(noting that Title VII does not bar a claim of sex 
discrimination merely because the plaintiff and the defendant 
are of the same sex). 
139 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250, 235 
(1989) (finding that an employer discriminated against a female 
employee on the basis of sex, by refusing to promote the 
employee because the employer believed she portrayed herself in 
a stereotypically male fashion). 
140 See, e.g., Smith v. Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a fire department discriminated against a 
transsexual male firefighter on the basis of sex by means of 
sexual stereotyping, where the firefighter acted effeminately); 
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters. Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th 
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courts have been reluctant to extend Title VII to include sexual 
orientation as a form of discrimination on the basis of sex, 
leaving homosexual employees vulnerable to sexual orientation 
discrimination due to inconsistent protection under federal 
law.141 The inconsistency with which the courts deal with sexual 
orientation discrimination demonstrates the need for Congress to 
create specific federal legislation that unequivocally prohibits 
employers from discriminating against their employees based on 
their employees’ sexual orientation.142 
Moreover, while some states have passed their own anti-
 
Cir. 2001) (upholding a homosexual employee’s Title VII sexual 
harassment claim, finding that coworkers who harassed the 
homosexual employee for acting too feminine discriminated 
against him on the basis of sex). 
141 See, e.g., Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36 (defining the issue as 
whether the employer offered members of one sex disadvantageous 
employment terms and conditions over members of another sex, 
rather than offering disadvantageous employment terms and 
conditions over members of a certain sexual orientation). 
142 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 11 (2001) (arguing that Congress’ 
failure to enact federal legislation prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination is a tacit endorsement of anti-gay 
bias). 
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discrimination statutes that expressly prohibit employers from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, many states 
have not.143 Senators opposing ENDA argued that Congress does 
not need to be responsible for enacting federal legislation when 
the states are enacting their own anti-discrimination 
legislation.144 Their concern was that the states that had 
prohibited sexual orientation discrimination limited their 
 
143 See Summary Of States Which Prohibit Discrimination Based On 
Sexual Orientation (June 24, 2004) (listing California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington D.C., and 
Wisconsin as the states that have either civil rights 
legislation or executive orders that protect employees from 
sexual orientation discrimination), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=185 (last modified June 24, 
2004). 
144 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (noting how the thirteen 
states that enacted laws prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination at the time had tailored these laws to their own 
needs and sensitivities by defining “sexual orientation” in 
different ways).  
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statutes’ protections to non-criminal activity, whereas ENDA did 
not make such a distinction.145 ENDA, being federal law, would 
preempt states’ anti-discrimination laws146 and therefore would 
have forced employers to employ homosexuals that the states 
deemed were engaging in the criminal conduct of sodomy.147 The
Court in Lawrence foreclosed that argument when it 
decriminalized all state sodomy statues because ENDA’s 
definition of “sexual orientation” no longer conflicts with 
states’ definitions of “sexual orientation” regarding the 
criminality of private, homosexual conduct.148 
145 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(15) (2004) (narrowing Rhode 
Island’s definition of “sexual orientation” to define the status 
of a person rather than to render criminal conduct lawful). 
146 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring the U.S. 
Constitution and federal law to be the supreme law of the land, 
notwithstanding state laws to the contrary). 
147 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 40 (2001) (arguing that because ENDA 
would preempt state law, it should take into account different 
states’ definitions of “sexual orientation” by recognizing that 
homosexual conduct is criminal behavior under certain state’s 
criminal codes). 
148 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (demonstrating that pre-
Lawrence, Senators claimed that ENDA likely would conflict with 
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Moreover, while Senators opposing ENDA would have liked to 
have left it up to the states to continue enacting their own 
legislation, Congress has enacted Federal anti-discrimination 
legislation in the past, even when some states had already 
prohibited similar discrimination.149 For example, when Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several states already had 
some form of civil rights law prohibiting racial 
discrimination.150 Furthermore, Congress passed the Americans 
 
many state laws because ENDA failed to account for the varying 
definitions of “sexual orientation” among state laws). 
149 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (noting that Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it recognized that a 
large number of states offered no protection against racial 
discrimination).  But see 151 CONG. REC. S146-01, S365 
(2005)(statement by Sen. Allard) (demonstrating Congress’ 
attempt to limit homosexuals’ rights via the “Marriage 
Protection Amendment” which is a constitutional amendment that 
defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman). 
150 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1945) (exemplifying 
New Jersey’s Civil Rights Law that prohibited employers from 
discriminating against employees on the basis of race, enacted 
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); accord CONN GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-60 (West 1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 711 (1953) 
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with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), even though several states 
provided some protection to individuals with disabilities prior 
to 1990.151 In passing these two pieces of legislation, Congress 
affirmed that civil rights is a matter of national interest and 
that Congress is responsible for creating uniform standards to 
reinforce the nation’s commitment to equality.152 
2. ENDA’s Narrow Drafting And The Court’s Reasoning In 
Lawrence Debunk ENDA’s Opposition’s Arguments 
 
Senators opposing ENDA cited concerns that ENDA would force 
employers with deeply held religious and moral beliefs, who find 
homosexuality morally repugnant, to hire homosexual employees.153 
151 See, e.g., WIS.STAT.ANN. § 111.321 (West 1981) (demonstrating 
Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Law, enacted 9 years prior to the 
federal ADA, that prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of disability). 
152 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (arguing that it is 
Congress’s responsibility to create a uniform standard of 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, just 
like it was Congress’ responsibility to create a uniform 
standard of prohibiting discrimination based on race, 
disability, and age). 
153 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9991 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (fearing 
that ENDA would override millions of Americans’ moral and 
religious sensibilities). 
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Before Lawrence, the Court validated this critique by holding 
that the Boy Scouts of America, a non-religious group, did not 
have to employ a homosexual Scout Master because this 
effectively would force the Boy Scouts to send a message that 
homosexual conduct is a legitimate form of behavior, when in 
fact the Boy Scouts wanted to send the contrary message, namely 
that they morally opposed homosexuality.154 The 1996 version of 
ENDA exempted only non-profit religious groups, drawing harsh 
criticism from opposing Senators who objected to ENDA’s 
applicability to for-profit, religious organizations that held 
the same moral reprehension to homosexuality as their non-profit 
counterparts.155 The 2003 version of ENDA is more narrowly 
 
154 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) 
(legitimizing the Boy Scouts’ concern that a homosexual Scout 
Master would be a bad role model). 
155 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing 
that a for-profit religious organization, such as a Christian 
book store, should not forfeit its right to condemn 
homosexuality just because it makes a profit).  But see 142 
CONG.REC. at S9986, S10002 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting 
that ENDA 1996 provided a broader religious exemption than Title 
VII and that ENDA 1996 exempted only nonprofit religious 
businesses, consistent with other civil rights laws, because the 
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constructed, exempting all religious organizations, regardless 
of their profit status, thereby allaying opposing Senators’ 
previous concerns.156 While the 2003 version of ENDA does not 
exempt the Boy Scouts, the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence 
rebutted the premise that employers who are morally opposed to 
homosexuality may discriminate against homosexual employees 
because the Lawrence decision specifically recognized that 
society’s moral judgments on homosexuality cannot be a rational 
basis for discrimination.157 Additionally, the purpose of civil 
 
drafters considered nonprofit businesses to be more directly 
associated with religious teachings while the for-profit 
businesses were more secular in nature). 
156 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 9 (2003) (defining “religious organization” as, “A) a 
religious corporation, association, or society; or B) a school, 
college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning if, i) the institution is ... 
controlled, managed, owned, or supported by a religion, 
religious corporation, association, or society; or ii) the 
curriculum of the institution is directed toward the propagation 
of religion”). 
157 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 577-78 (finding that a state’s 
traditional view that homosexual conduct is immoral is not a 
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rights laws, like Title VII, is to protect the minority and 
combat those moral and ethical beliefs against disparaged 
classes so that everyone has an equal opportunity in 
employment.158 Protecting citizens’ civil rights is a basic 
federal duty, and ENDA is a proper response to sexual 
orientation discrimination.159 
Furthermore, nothing in ENDA protects inappropriate 
behavior, whether perpetrated by a homosexual employee or by a 
heterosexual employee.160 As with the ADA, a person in the 
protected class cannot engage in bizarre behavior, must be 
 
sufficient reason to prohibit it). 
158 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9994 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing 
that Congress has enacted previous civil rights laws in order to 
prohibit employers from using their ethical and moral beliefs as 
a basis for discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity, 
national origin, gender, and disability). 
159 See 142 CONG.REC. at S10002 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(stating that Congress has the duty to set national standard of 
fairness and equality so that citizens may travel across the 
country without facing unjust discrimination). 
160 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9999 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
(asserting that ENDA does not protect inappropriate conduct, 
such as a waiter or waitress kissing on their job). 
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qualified for the job, and must abide by workplace rules.161 A
homosexual teacher, publicly engaging in homosexual conduct, is 
just as inappropriate as a heterosexual teacher engaging in the 
same conduct.162 ENDA treats homosexual employees wearing 
inappropriate clothing and accessories the same as heterosexual 
employees wearing similarly inappropriate clothing and 
accessories.163 Moreover, the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence 
prohibits employers from objecting to homosexual conduct as an 
 
161 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003) 
(holding that an employer did not discriminate against an 
employee based on disability where the employer fired the 
employee for testing positive for cocaine at work, and where the 
company had a policy of not rehiring employees whom the employer 
terminated for violating workplace rules).  
162 See ,e.g., Petit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 889 
(Cal. 1973) (finding that a public school properly discharged a 
teacher, who went to a “swingers” club with her husband, and 
engaged in three separate acts of oral copulation). 
163 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-247 (1976) 
(upholding a police department’s hair and grooming standards 
because they promoted the legitimate government interests of 
keeping uniformity in their police departments as well as 
promoting esprit de corps). 
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objectionable behavior unto itself because the Lawrence Court 
constitutionally protects homosexual conduct as a private, 
liberty interest, not subject to society’s moral objections.164 
Similarly, Senators opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
argued that the legislation would force employers to hire black 
employees, which many employers morally opposed.165 However, the 
Supreme Court consistently has rejected these arguments and 
upheld employees’ Title VII racial, religious, sex, and national 
origin discrimination claims.166 
164 See 539 U.S. 577-78 (stating that individuals’ private, 
homosexual conducts deserve the same privacy interests as 
married and unmarried individuals’ interests in their intimate 
conduct). 
165 See 142 CONG.REC. at S10003 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(recalling Senators’ arguments that blacks did not deserve 
federal protection from discrimination because these Senators 
believed that blacks did not work hard, were lazy, and were not 
competent). 
166 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
801 (1973) (upholding a black employee’s Title VII racial 
discrimination claim, where an employer treated employees of one 
race differently than employees of another race); see also 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) 
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Senators should also not use ENDA’s “perception” language 
as an excuse to reject ENDA because including this language is 
most consistent with Congress’ intent to prevent 
discrimination.167 Senators opposing ENDA voiced concerns that 
ENDA not only covers discrimination against known homosexual 
employees, but also covers discrimination against employees whom 
employers and colleagues perceive to be homosexual.168 Some in 
Congress fear that this definition would lead to a deluge of 
litigation over the definitions of homosexuality and 
perception.169 However, ENDA’s “perception” language is 
 
(holding that a woman’s claim of a hostile work environment 
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, and was 
therefore actionable under Title VII) 
167 See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 30 (2001) (arguing that by reading 
“perception” language into civil rights statutes the courts are 
supporting the spirit in which Congress has enacted such 
statutes). 
168 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 3(a)(9) (2003) (defining “sexual orientation” as, 
“homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether the 
orientation is real or perceived”).  
169 See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (claiming that ENDA will 
force employers to settle sexual orientation discrimination 
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consistent with similar language in other federal civil rights 
legislation, such as the ADA.170 Moreover, many courts have read 
“perception” language into Title VII, even though Title VII does 
not expressly prohibit discrimination based on the employers’ 
perceptions.171 For example, courts have interpreted Title VII 
to encompass employers who discriminate based on their 
perceptions of their employees’ sex by means of sex 
stereotyping.172 Furthermore, ENDA’s “perception” language is 
consistent with many state anti-discrimination statutes’ 
 
claims because the only way for employers to defend themselves 
using ENDA’s broad definition of “sexual orientation” is by 
proving a negative). 
170 See American’s With Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 
12102(2)(C)(2005) (prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against employees whom the employer knows or regards as being 
disabled). 
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (containing the language “because of 
such individual’s race ... national origin” and not “perception 
of such individual’s race ... national origin”). 
172 See, e.g., Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (holding that 
discrimination based on the employer’s perception that the 
employee is effeminate is discrimination because of sex, and 
therefore actionable under Title VII). 
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definition of sexual orientation discrimination.173 
ENDA’s narrow construction also refutes opposing Senators’ 
concerns that ENDA will give the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) the power to require employers to provide 
the EEOC with data on the sexual orientation of their 
employees.174 They argue that in order to defend against sexual 
orientation discrimination claims, employers will need to be 
able to show that they do in fact hire homosexual employees.175 
They claim that the only way employers can show that they hire 
homosexual employees is by keeping statistics on the sexual 
 
173 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2 (2004) (defining 
“sexual orientation” as “having or being perceived as having an 
orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or 
homosexuality”). 
174 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (alleging 
that ENDA invites employers to gather statistics based on sexual 
orientation because Section 11 of ENDA 1996 grants the EEOC the 
same enforcement power as it already has under Title VII). 
175 See id. (explaining how the EEOC would require employers to 
keep statistics of their employees’ sexual orientations so as to 
defend against pattern and practice cases, where the plaintiff 
complains that the employer has a policy that discriminates by 
failing to hire homosexual employees). 
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orientations of their employees and invading their privacy.176 
Again, ENDA’s narrow construction refutes these claims by 
expressly prohibiting the EEOC from collecting statistics.177 
Moreover, the EEOC recordkeeping and reporting requirements 
also suggest that the EEOC will not require employers to keep 
statistics on the sexual orientation of their employees, and 
this lack of a requirement does not preclude those aggrieved by 
their employers on the basis of sex, age, or disability from 
successfully litigating claims.178 The EEOC’s only reporting 
requirement, applicable to private sector employees, is the EEO-
1 form, which does not request any information regarding 
 
176 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9998 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing 
that employers, in order to protect themselves from litigation 
under ENDA, will need to inquire and keep records of their 
employees’ sexual orientations). 
177 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 7 (2003) (prohibiting the EEOC from collecting or 
compelling the collection of statistics on sexual orientation 
from covered entities).  
178 See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (2005) (stating that the EEOC does 
not require employers, in general, to keep or make records under 
Title VII and the ADA). 
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employees’ ages or disabilities.179 It is unlikely that the EEOC 
would require employers to gather information regarding their 
employees’ sexual orientations on the EEO-1 form because 
employers do not need to know their employees’ sexual 
orientations in order to comply with ENDA.180 The Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection, designed to help employers 
create employee selection procedures that comply with Title VII, 
also include recordkeeping requirements.181 However, these 
guidelines only address issues of disparate impact 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin and therefore would not apply to ENDA, which 
 
179 See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2005) (requiring employers of one 
hundred or more employees to file annually a form with the EEOC 
that has information about the race, national origin, and gender 
of their employees). 
180 See 142 CONG.REC. at S10057 (stating that because the EEOC does 
not require employers to keep records on the disabilities and 
ages of their employees, there is no reason to believe they 
would require employers to keep records on the sexual 
orientations of their employees).  
181 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2005) (suggesting that employers keep 
records documenting the impact that their employee selection 
procedures have on members of Title VII-protected classes). 
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specifically excludes disparate impact as a cause of action.182 
By barring employees from making disparate impact claims, 
which allege that an employer’s facially neutral employment 
policy negatively impacts members of a protected class, EDNA 
actually further discourages employers from collecting 
statistics on their employees’ sexual orientations.183 ENDA’s 
narrow focus on disparate treatment claims forces the EEOC and 
courts to examine employers’ subjective intents rather than 
employers’ general employment practices, thereby eliminating the 
employers’ needs to keep statistics to establish their use of 
fair employment practices in compliance with ENDA.184 
182 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2005) (providing guidance to 
employers on how to use tests and other employee selection 
procedures so as to comply with Title VII without creating a 
disparate impact on Title VII-protected classes); see also 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1705, 108th Cong. 
§ 4(f) (2003) (omitting disparate impact as a cause of action). 
183 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 4(f) (2003) (stating that employees may only bring suit 
on disparate treatment claims). 
184 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 26 (2001) (asserting that the 
purpose of ENDA is to prohibit intentional discrimination based 
on sexual orientation in employment, rather than extending 
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Finally, ENDA’s narrow construction allays Senators’ fears 
that ENDA will create extra protections for homosexual employees 
and reverse discrimination against heterosexual employees.185 
ENDA specifically prohibits employers from using quotas to 
ensure that they hire proportionate numbers of employees of 
every sexual orientation.186 ENDA also prohibits employers from 
using affirmative action or other preferential treatment on the 
basis of sexual orientation.187 As a result, employers will not 
need to know their employees’ or applicants’ sexual orientations 
 
special rights to homosexual employees). 
185 See 142 CONG.REC. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (alleging 
that because ENDA gives Federal courts the same enforcement 
power as they hold under Title VII, courts will be obliged to 
implement affirmative action or other equitable relief to remedy 
where an employer intentionally discriminated against an 
employee based on sexual orientation in violation of ENDA). 
186 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 8(a)(2003) (prohibiting employers from adopting or 
implementing quotas on the basis of sexual orientation). 
187 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
Cong. § 8(b)(2003) (prohibiting employers from giving 
preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of sexual 
orientation). 
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in order to comply with ENDA because ENDA precludes employers 
from taking their employees’ and applicants’ sexual orientations 
into account when making hiring and promoting decisions.188 
IV. Conclusion 
This Comment has discussed the many ways in which Lawrence 
will help protect homosexual employees from sexual orientation 
discrimination in public employment.  First, the Court’s 
decision ultimately shifts the paradigm from a rational basis 
test, which strongly favors employers, to a much more diluted 
one, which provides greater protection to homosexual 
employees.189 Second, the Court’s decision provides a 
springboard for a future Court to expressly declare gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals as a suspect class and private, 
homosexual conduct as part of a fundamental right to privacy; 
 
188 See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (stating ENDA’s drafters’ 
intentions that ENDA extend Title VII protections to cover 
employees’ sexual orientation). 
189 See supra part IIIA (arguing that post-Lawrence, courts will 
apply much more exacting scrutiny to employers’ rationales that 
homosexual employees are unfit for employment as criminals, and 
that employing homosexual employees will destroy workplace 
unity, compromise public credibility, and pose national security 
risks). 
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thereby providing homosexual employees with more exacting 
scrutiny for their Equal Protection and Due Process claims.190 
Finally, the Court’s decision, combined with a narrower drafting 
of ENDA, provides a solid foundation for Congress to enact the 
long overdue Employment Non-Discrimination Act.191 
Once Congress enacts ENDA, homosexual employees will no 
longer need to depend solely on a court’s interpretation of 
their constitutional rights.  Instead, employers who take 
adverse employment actions against their homosexual employees 
will automatically trigger ENDA, which will provide federal, 
explicit, uniform protections in both the public and private 
sectors.192 In addition to homosexual employees bringing actions 
 
190 See supra part IIIB (alleging that the Court’s focus in 
Lawrence tacitly recognized private, homosexual conduct as a 
fundamental right, even though the Court did not expressly do 
so). 
191 See supra part IIIC (demonstrating how the Court’s Lawrence 
decision plus ENDA’s more narrow drafting, rebuts opposing 
Senator’s objections to enacting ENDA). 
192 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) (providing a cause 
of action to employees whose employers discriminated against on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), 
with Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th 
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under ENDA, future litigation may also focus on heterosexual 
employees and applicants claiming employers gave preferential 
treatment to homosexual employees, reading a cause of action 
into ENDA’s prohibition of quotas and preferential treatment.  
An investigation of Title VII’s legislative history and case law 
should provide significant guidance as to what the future of 
sexual orientation discrimination will ultimately look like in 
post-ENDA jurisprudence. 
 
Cong. § 4(a)(1-2) (2003) (providing a cause of action to 
employees whose employers discriminated against on the basis of 
sexual orientation). 
